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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Central banks have a reputation for secrecy. Policy boards of central banks generally deliberate
in secret, like judicial panels. In sharp contrast with judicial bodies in most major democracies,
however, central bank policy is often implemented without any detailed justi￿cation and often
with no announcement at all. The norm of secrecy has recently been rejected, most notably in
in￿ation-targeting countries such as New Zealand, the U.K., and Sweden. In one way or another,
these countries have made an explicit commitment to stable low in￿ation as their primary goal
of monetary policy, and the central banks issue transparent in￿ation reports laying out in￿ation
forecasts, explaining how policy will respond to various contingencies, and accounting for past
errors.
Rationalizing transparency and openness is easy. Goodfriend [13] strongly criticized the
Federal Reserve￿s arguments for secrecy in a famous court case, and Blinder [4] recently provided
a strong case for openness and accountability, arguing that this makes independent central
banking more consistent with democracy and improves the stabilization properties of monetary
policy.1 In the literature on in￿ation targeting, transparency has been motivated as a way
of improving the incentives for central banks to pursue their announced goals, in addition to
facilitating the implementation of monetary policy by increasing its predictability by the private
sector (see, for instance, Svensson [24] and [25]).
Rationalizing the secrecy norm is not so easy. Milton Friedman commented that ￿From
revealed preference, I suspect that by far and away the two most important variables in their
[Federal Reserve policymakers￿] loss function are avoiding accountability on the one hand and
achieving public prestige on the other￿ (quoted in Fischer [10], footnote 52). While secrecy could
stem from central bankers￿ desires to protect their egos, it seems unlikely that central bankers
are more a⁄ected by such motives than judges or heads of government agencies. If Friedman￿s
argument is correct, one might wonder why society sets up structures indulging the secrecy fetish
of central bankers but generally not indulging such urges elsewhere.
The seminal work by Cukierman and Meltzer [8] (CM) provides a di⁄erent explanation of
central bank secrecy. CM build on the Kydland and Prescott [15] and Barro and Gordon [2]
(KPBG) models of optimizing policy by adding a time-varying source of in￿ation bias and
1 Both quote Karl Brunner for support: ￿Central banking [has been] traditionally surrounded by a peculiar
and protective political mystique...The mystique thrives on a pervasive impression that Central Banking is an
esoteric art. Access to this art and its proper execution is con￿ned to the initiated elite. The esoteric nature of
the art is moreover revealed by an inherent impossibility to articulate its insights in explicit and intelligible words
and sentences￿ (as quoted in Goodfriend [13]).
1making this bias private information of the central bank. At certain times, the bank values
employment particularly highly and would like to use in￿ation surprises to attain that goal.
While the bank cannot, on average, surprise the public, CM shows that if control errors mask
the true intention of the bank, the bank can use in￿ation surprises to raise output during the
periods when it is most valuable. In this framework, improving the public￿s inference￿either
through improved central-bank control of the target variable or through less secrecy regarding
intentions￿raises the reputation cost to the bank of manipulating in￿ation surprises. Thus,
increased transparency and control can each help sustain commitment to a low in￿ation goal.
The most notable result in CM is that central banks might well choose deliberately imperfect
control in order to mask their intentions.2
A paper by Faust and Svensson [9] (FS) has recently extended CM in two ways, by clearly
distinguishing the roles of transparency on the one hand and the degree of control on the other
(transparency and control are in indistinguishable in CM) and by allowing a more realistic and
standard quadratic loss function for the central bank (the loss function in CM is indi⁄erent to
output variability). FS demonstrates that these extensions have several important implications,
but that paper mainly considers exogenously ￿xed transparency and control, and does not
consider what levels would endogenously emerge.3
This paper takes up the endogenous choice of transparency and control under the Faust-
Svensson extension of CM. While CM only considers the choice of control-error variance under
commitment, we consider the separate choices of transparency and control under both commit-
ment and discretion. With regard to the degree of control, under commitment, we ￿nd that the
choice of a less than maximum degree of control is far less likely (con￿ned to a smaller and less
plausible portion of the parameter space) under the standard quadratic loss function than for
the more special loss function used by CM. Under discretion, the maximum degree of control is
the only equilibrium for the standard loss function. Thus, both the standard loss function and
discretion weaken the CM result. With regard to the degree of transparency, under commit-
ment, we restate the FS result that a su¢ciently patient bank with a su¢ciently low average
in￿ation bias will always choose minimal transparency. Under discretion, both minimum and
maximum transparency are equilibria. We argue that discretion over the degree of control and
2 Stein [23] provides an alternative account of imprecise communication that we take up below.
3 Several papers, including Andersen [1], Cukierman and Meltzer [7], Persson and Tabellini [20], Muscatelli
[17] and Walsh [29] examine how announcements by central banks may potentially reveal private information
about the goals of the banks or the state of economy, but they do not consider central banks￿ endogenous choice
of transparency.
2commitment over the degree of transparency seem the most realistic assumptions. This pair of
assumptions would lead to maximum feasible control by very opaque central banks, which is
arguably the result observed, say, for the Federal Reserve System and the Bundesbank.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses the choice of degree of control and section
4 examines endogenous announcements and the choice of degree of transparency. Section 5
discusses the empirical relevance of discretion and commitment for the choice of the degrees of
control and transparency. Section 6 presents some conclusions. The appendix supplies technical
details.
2 The basic model and its solution
This section reviews the model and the elements of the equilibrium under ￿xed transparency and
control that form the building blocks for understanding the endogenous choice of transparency
and control. The basic framework begins with the simplest KPBG-style economy where the
central bank has an in￿ation bias that emerges when the bank￿s employment target exceeds the
natural employment level. Following CM, the bank￿s employment target ￿uctuates randomly
(as a ￿rst-order autoregressive process) and is not observable to the private sector. When
the employment target is high, the bank has an incentive to use positive in￿ation surprises to
boost employment. This moving employment target may, for instance, represent changes in the
composition of the Monetary Policy Committee, or the response of the bank to external pressure
from various special interests.
The private sector observes macroeconomic outcomes and optimally learns about the central
bank￿s employment target. The bank uses in￿ation surprises to raise output during the periods
when it is most valuable. Both increased transparency and better control allow the private
sector to infer the bank￿s employment target more precisely, thus making the bank￿s reputation
and the implied in￿ation expectations more sensitive to the bank￿s actions. This reduces the
bank￿s ability to generate bene￿cial surprises.
2.1 The model
The model has two agents, the private sector and the central bank. The private sector￿s behavior
is summarized by two relations. First, employment is generated by a standard Phillips curve,
lt =( … t¡… t j t ¡ 1)+" t; (2.1)
3where lt is (log) employment in period t,a n d… t is the in￿ation rate in period t (the change in
the log price level between period t ¡ 1 and period t)a n d" tis an employment shock (a supply
shock).4 Private-sector expectations of in￿ation, …tjt¡1; are rational in that they constitute the
mathematical expectation, given available information. In order to keep track of the asymmetric
information, our conventions are that the expectations operator with respect to central bank
information is denoted by E, and the one with respect to private-sector information is denoted by
Ep. Subscripts like tjt¡1 always indicate the private-sector conditional expectation of a variable
in period t, given the information available in period t¡1; thus, given the rational expectations
assumption, …tjt¡1 · E
p
t¡1…t. The central bank has imperfect control over in￿ation,
…t = it + ·t, (2.2)
where it is the central bank￿s intention for in￿ation, and ·t is a mean-zero control error. This
captures the realistic feature that observables do not ￿awlessly reveal central-bank intentions.5





where ﬂ (0 <ﬂ<1) is a discount factor, and where Lt is the period loss in period t.T h e
standard period loss function in such models increases with the square of in￿ation and with the










A special aspect of this model is that the employment target, l⁄
t; follows a ￿rst-order autoregres-
sive process not directly observable to the private sector:
l⁄
t = l⁄ +zt; (2.5)
zt = ‰zt¡1 + ￿t, (2.6)
where l⁄ ‚ 0, 0 <‰<1 ,a n d￿ tis a mean-zero shock to the target.







t ¡ (l⁄ + zt)(l t¡" t) (2.7)
4 The average rate of employment, E[l t], is normalized to equal zero.
5 What we call the intention, CM [7] calls the plan.
4(expressed in our notation). This di⁄ers from the standard loss function in two ways. First,
only intended in￿ation ￿gures in the ￿rst term; in￿ation due to the control error does not enter.
Second, this loss function is linear in employment.6 These two features mean that the bank is
indi⁄erent to any in￿ation generated by control error variance. Furthermore, the bank would
accept arbitrary increases in employment variance in return for arbitrarily small decreases in
average in￿ation. Both these features are at odds with our understanding of the objectives of
actual central banks.
Following Cukierman and Meltzer [7] (CM2), we also allow the central bank to make an
announcement at the end of each period t ¡ 1, before the expectations for period t have been
￿xed. The announcement is made as a single number, »t.
The central bank has full information about its preferences and, at the end of period t,i t
has full information about all period t shocks. The private sector does not observe the central
bank￿s employment target and intention. The timing within in each period is as follows. At the
e n do fp e r i o dt¡1 , the private sector forms its expectations of period t variables. The central
bank observes these expectations. At the beginning of period t (called t¡), the central bank
observes its employment target, zt, and the supply shock, "t; and chooses its intention, it. Next,
the control error, ·t, is realized, giving …t: The private sector observes …t and "t,a n ds e t sl t .
Next, the central bank announces »t to the private sector. Then the cycle begins again. All
shocks in the model are jointly normal, mutually uncorrelated, and have zero means and ￿xed
positive variances. The variance of any shock xt is denoted ￿2
x.
2.2 Solving the model taking the degree of control and transparency as exogenous
We assume that the private sector believes that the central bank￿s policy follows the reaction
function
it = k0 + k1"t + k2zt + k3ztjt¡1, (2.8)
for some coe¢cients k0,. . . ,k 3that remain to be determined.
The private sector further believes￿and, except in section 4.2, the central bank behaves
such that￿the announcement »t is generated according to
»t = ·t + ”t; (2.9)
6 In the CM loss function, l
⁄
t = l
⁄ + zt is interpreted as a marginal bene￿t of more employment, rather than
as an employment target.
5where ”t is noise with variance ￿2
”. The variance ￿2
” determines the quality of the announcement.








which is the squared correlation of ·t and »t. We refer to ¿ as the degree of transparency.
When ¿ =1(maximum transparency), ￿2
” =0and »t fully reveals ·t;w h e n¿=0(minimum
transparency), ￿2
” = 1 and »t is a useless signal (recall that ￿2
· > 0).7
An announcement of the form (2.9) should be interpreted as a fuzzy account by the bank
of the most recent control error. Since the private sector at the end of t attempts to determine
whether a given in￿ation surprise (…t ¡ …tjt¡1) was an intentional action by the bank or was
due to the control error, the private sector will use this information optimally in updating its
estimate of the bank￿s employment target.8
Given the belief in (2.8), private-sector expected in￿ation is
…tjt¡1 = k0 +(k 2+k 3)z tj t¡ 1; (2.11)
and employment evolves according to
lt = it + ·t ¡ k0 ¡ (k2 + k3)ztjt¡1 +"t: (2.12)
In a rational-expectations equilibrium, the private sector￿s belief in (2.8) is correct, and equilib-
rium dynamics are,
…t = k0 + k1"t + k2zt + k3ztjt¡1 + ·t (2.13)
…tjt¡1 = k0 +( k 2+k 3)z t j t ¡ 1 (2.14)
…t ¡ …tjt¡1 = k1"t + k2(zt ¡ ztjt¡1)+· t (2.15)
lt =( 1 + k 1 ) " t + k 2 ( z t ¡ z t j t ¡ 1 )+· t (2.16)
lt ¡ l⁄
t =( 1 + k 1 ) " t + k 2 ( z t ¡ z t j t ¡ 1 )+· t¡l ⁄¡z t (2.17)
These results follow from simply assuming that the private sector believes (2.8) and that this
belief is consistent with a rational-expectations equilibrium. The optimal ks in the reaction




” , ful￿lls s = 1
1¡¿ .
8 Our formulation of the announcement is slightly di⁄erent from CM2. In the CM2 formulation, the an-
nouncement comes after the central bank has observed ￿t, but before private-sector in￿ation expectations for t
are formed. The only substantive di⁄erence is then that in CM2, the announcement can reveal something about
both the ‰zt¡1 and the ￿t portions of zt, whereas in our formulation, the information is only about ‰zt¡1.
6function and the optimal evolution of ztjt¡1 remain to be determined, and the reaction function
( 2 . 8 )t ob ev e r i ￿ e d .
At the end of period t, the private sector knows …t, "t, ztjt¡1 and »t ( i na d d i t i o nt ot h e
coe¢cients and parameters of the model). The private sector can then construct the variable
yt · …t ¡ k0 ¡k1"t ¡ k3ztjt¡1 ¡ ¿»t: (2.18)
Under the private sector￿s belief in (2.8) and (2.9), this variable ful￿lls
yt = k2zt +( · t¡¿»t); (2.19)
where the noise term ·t¡¿»t has zero mean and minimum variance.9 Equation (2.19) is then the
measurement equation and (2.6) is the transition equation in a standard Kalman-￿lter problem.
The private sector￿s optimal estimate of zt+1 is then, as in FS, given by the Kalman updating
equation,
zt+1jt =( ‰¡gk2)ztjt¡1 +gyt; (2.20)




When ztjt¡1 evolves in this way, the economy has two state variables, zt and ztjt¡1: zt is
the bank￿s employment target, and ztjt¡1 is the private sector￿s best estimate of the target. We
will call ztjt¡1 the bank￿s reputation, since it summarizes the private sector￿s assessment of the
bank￿s future behavior.
To solve for the optimal reaction function for it, we recursively de￿ne the central bank￿s
value function as




Lt + ﬂV(zt+1jt;z t)
i
, (2.21)
where Et¡ denotes the expectations of the central bank given its information at the beginning
of period t, after it has observed "t and ￿t; but before ·t, …t, »t,a n dl thave been realized. Since
the loss function is quadratic and the two state variables evolve linearly, the value function will
be quadratic,








t¡1+–5z tjt¡1z t¡1; (2.22)
for some coe¢cients –0, ..., –5 that remain to be determined.
9 Recall that by (2.9), E[·t j »t]=¿»t: Then, whereas ·t has the variance ￿
2
·;· t¡ ¿»t has the minimum
variance (1 ¡ ¿)￿
2
·. Then, subtraction of ¿»t in (2.18) makes yt the best possible signal.
10 The parameterization of the signal in this paper di⁄ers slightly from FS. The equivalence and mapping
between the parameterizations are shown in appendix A. The interpretation of ¿ i st h es a m ei ne i t h e rc a s e .





Lt + ﬂV(zt+1jt;z t)
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The bank trades o⁄ the bene￿ts in period t of a period t in￿ation surprise (the left side of
(2.24)) against the costs from period t +1onward (the middle and the right side). A positive
surprise at t will raise employment, which is good when zt is high. The surprise will incur a more
in￿ationary reputation of the bank, whose future costs are given by the right side of (2.24).
A rational-expectations equilibrium for the model is a set of ks solving the bank￿s decision
problem. The model has been solved in FS (and, for the loss function (2.7), in CM). The aspects
of the solution that are of importance for this paper are reported in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1. When the private sector believes (2.8) and (2.9) and the central bank follows
(2.9) for a given ¿; 0 • ¿ • 1, the solution to the bank￿s decision problem for it has the form
(2.8).
(i) For the standard loss function: 0 <k 0<l ⁄ ,k 1=¡1
2 ,0<k 3• k 2< 1
2 , g>0 ,
‰ ¡ gk2 > 0,a n d– 2>0 .
(ii) For the CM loss function: 0 <k 0<l ⁄,k 1=k 3=0 ,0<k 2<1 ,a n d– 2=0 .
The proposition is proved in FS.11 Some explanation of the key results is useful. Initially
consider part (i), the standard loss function. The parameter k0 is the average rate of in￿ation,
so k0 may be considered as the average in￿ation bias. In equilibrium, the average bias must be
su¢cient to keep the bank from using in￿ation surprises on average. When l⁄ =0 , the bank, on
average, aims at the natural level of employment and, thus, k0 =0since, on average, the bank
has no incentive for using in￿ation surprises. As usual in these models, we ￿nd that k1 = ¡ 1
2
optimally distributes the supply shock e⁄ects between in￿ation and employment. The parameter
k2 is positive, implying that a higher employment target leads to higher in￿ation. Finally, the
positive sign of –2 implies that the bank is averse to variance in its reputation, as one would
expect for the quadratic loss.
11 For the CM loss function, CM shows that the rational expectations equilibrium is unique. For the standard
loss function, FS ￿nds strong numerical evidence of uniqueness, but have no formal proof. The statements about
the equilibrium for the standard loss function hold at any rational-expectations equilibrium under the assumptions.
8For the CM loss function, when l⁄ =0 ;the bank is, on average, indi⁄erent about employment,
so no average in￿ation bias results. The bank ignores its reputation in forming policy (k3 =0 ),
and the variance of its reputation does not a⁄ect its loss (–2 =0 ) . With this machinery in place,
we can begin the examination of an endogenous selection of noise levels.
3 Choosing the degree of control with exogenous degree of transparency
We start with the case studied by CM: choosing the control-error variance under commitment.
In this section, we are not concerned with transparency and the announcement, so we ￿x ¿ and
maintain the assumption that the central bank must generate »t, according to (2.9). (For the
CM loss function, we set ¿ =0 , so there is no useful signal.)
3.1 Choosing control-error variance under commitment
Suppose that the central bank chooses the control-error variance, ￿2
·, once-and-for-all without
any knowledge of the state variables. Once ￿2
· is ￿xed, the central bank will face the problem
studied in section 2; thus, the expected loss for any ￿xed ￿2
· will be the unconditional expectation
of the loss function, EV (ztjt¡1;z t). 12 The central bank will choose the control-error variance to
minimize this unconditional expectation.
The unconditional expectation of the loss function equals the unconditional expectation of
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0 + Var[it] ¡ 2Cov[lt;z t]); (3.2)
We see that the two cases di⁄er by the terms ￿2
·+Var[lt]+l⁄2+Var[zt];where the last two terms
are exogenous and independent of ￿2
·. As CM recognizes ([8], footnote 31), the CM loss function
introduces a bias towards positive control-error variance relative to the standard loss in two ways.
First, in the standard loss, control error variance directly raises loss by raising the variance of
in￿ation; under the CM loss, only intended-in￿ation variance matters. Second, control errors
raise the variance of employment in the standard loss; under the CM loss, employment variance
has no impact.
12The –si nV are evaluated at the chosen ￿
2
·.
13Note that we have conveniently introduced the factor 1 ¡ ﬂ in (2.3).
9Since the complexity of the equilibrium prevents analytical results, we follow CM in nu-
merically exploring which parameter values lead to ￿2
· > 0 being optimal. As in FS, we




￿;l ⁄)2[0;10]4. The small parameter space is the same except that the discount
factor is ﬂ =0 : 99999 and the average employment target is l⁄ =0 . Thus, the small space only
considers patient banks with no average in￿ation bias. We compute the optimal ￿2
· for 100,000
points chosen uniformly from each parameter space. The proportion of parameter points for
which ￿2
· =0is preferred by the central bank can be interpreted as the share of the parameter
space for which ￿2
· =0is preferred.14
The following proposition con￿rms that the CM loss function introduces a bias towards
positive control-error variance, and that a positive control-error variance is preferred more often
for the small parameter space.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose the central bank chooses ￿2
· once-and-for-all under commitment,
without knowledge of the state of the economy.
(i) For the standard loss function, some ￿2
· > 0 is preferred by the bank for 1.3 percent of
the large parameter space and 28.8 percent of the small parameter space.
(ii) For the CM loss function, some ￿2
· > 0 is preferred by the bank for 95.1 percent of the
large parameter space and 100 percent of the small parameter space.
We can understand the existence of equilibria with positive control error variance in terms of
the e⁄ect of control errors on the average in￿ation bias and covariance between employment and
the target. Start from zero variance and consider a small increase. It is common to both loss
functions that the control-error variance will a⁄ect the unconditional loss via the squared average
in￿ation bias, k2
0, the variance of intentions, Var[it], and the covariance between employment
and the employment target, ¡Cov[lt;z t]. At zero control-error variance, the bank cannot use
surprises to generate a covariance between lt and zt, so this covariance is at a minimum. A slight
increase in the control-error variance from zero makes it more di¢cult for the private sector to
estimate the true employment target, which bene￿ts the bank under either loss function by
allowing it to increase the covariance between employment and the employment target.
14 Judd [14] discusses this sort of numerical analysis of theoretical models more fully. While this share must be
viewed as an estimate, with 100,000 draws it is estimated with great precision. In particular, if we call the true




x(1¡x)) » N(0;1),w h e r enis




^ x § 0:0062
p
x(1 ¡ x); if x is known. Since
p
x(1 ¡ x) is bounded by 0.5, an upper bound for a 95 percent
con￿dence interval is ^ x § 0:0031,t h a ti s ,§0 : 31 percentage points.
10When l⁄ > 0, raising the control error variance leads to higher k2
0, hurting the bank under
either loss. This is because the rise in the control-error variance from zero gives the bank an
incentive to generate positive in￿ation surprises on average. This cannot occur in equilibrium
and the average in￿ation expectation, k0, must increase to deter the bank from using surprises
on average. Since the average bias, k0,i sb o u n d e db yl ⁄ , the covariance bene￿t to the bank of
raising the control-error variance dominates the cost in terms of average bias. Thus, the CM-loss
bank generally bene￿ts from the increase in variance. Under the standard loss function, control
error variance has additional costs in the form of employment and in￿ation variance, and thus
zero control-error variance is preferred on a much larger share of the parameter space.
Under the standard loss function, the bank favors positive control error variance for a signif-
icantly greater share of the small parameter space. As noted above, setting l⁄ to zero eliminates
one cost of this variance. To understand how the higher ﬂ also contributes, it is helpful to
emphasize the two stages of the bank￿s decision-making. In the ￿rst stage, the bank chooses
control-error variance once-and-for-all under commitment. In the second stage (examined in
section 2) the bank chooses its intended in￿ation each period under discretion. Having a ﬂ
approximately equal to unity in the second stage maximizes the relative weight the bank places
on the future costs and bene￿ts of reputation. This makes the bank￿s behavior in stage 2 closer
to minimizing the unconditional loss function under commitment.15 Intuitively, we can view the
reputation e⁄ect as a punishment mechanism, and note that this mechanism is more e⁄ective
with higher ﬂ. When the public has a more e⁄ective punishment mechanism, it need not respond
to an increase in control-error variance with as large a rise in the average in￿ation bias￿rather
than deterring the bank from surprises ex ante with an average bias, it can deter it ex post with
degraded reputation. Thus, the marginal cost to the bank of raising the control-error variance
is reduced, and positive variance becomes optimal for a larger range of parameters.
3.2 Choosing control-error variance under discretion
Assuming that the central bank can somehow make a commitment regarding the control-error
variance is peculiar when one is also assuming that the central bank cannot commit regarding
the setting of the instrument. Below, we argue that this pair of assumptions is rather unlikely
to jointly hold in reality. At present, we simply demonstrate that results are sensitive to this
assumption.
15 This point is developed further in FS.
11Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the central bank chooses ￿2
· ‚ 0 at the beginning of each
period t (that is, at time t¡), before it chooses its intention for period t.
(i) For the standard loss function, ￿2
· =0is the only equilibrium.16
(ii) For the CM loss function, any value of ￿2
· ‚ 0 is an equilibrium.
The proposition is proved in appendix B. Part (ii) further illustrates the peculiar results that
may follow when the central bank is indi⁄erent to the variance of employment and to in￿ation
variance stemming from poor control. Under the CM loss function, the bank is totally indi⁄erent
to the noise level and will be willing to deliver any value expected by the private sector.
Part (i) was recognized by Goodfriend [13]. The intuition is as follows. At time t¡,a d d i n g
mean-zero noise to the reaction function cannot make the bank better o⁄ with respect to average
in￿ation or employment: the noise has no e⁄ect on the mean outcome. It does, however, damage
t h eb a n kb yr a i s i n gt h evariance of in￿ation and employment for period t. Furthermore, adding
mean-zero noise to the policy choice at t does not change the average reputation, zt+1jt,t h a t
the bank will take into t+1; it only raises the variance of reputation, which damages the bank.
Thus, proposition 3.1 shows that the bank might, in some cases, prefer to commit to some noise;
proposition 3.2 shows that when the time comes to deliver the noise, the bank prefers to renege.
In the standard KPBG literature, we can think of the central bank promising zero in￿ation,
but without commitment, the central bank has an incentive to renege on the promise and deliver
higher in￿ation. Here the situation is similar, but the e⁄ect is more virtuous. We can imagine
the bank promising noisy control, but without commitment, the bank has an incentive to renege
and use better control.
3.3 Robustness and the deliberate injection of noise under discretion
While we consider a somewhat broader range of equilibria than CM, we still have only considered
a small range of the possible equilibria of the basic model￿Markov equilibria with linear learning
functions. We believe, however, that the equilibria we focus on are of special interest, especially
in the light of the existing literature. The set of equilibria that would emerge if we suspended
assumptions (2.8) and (2.9), which keep the equilibria linear, and allowed a general signalling
framework, might be quite large.17 For this reason, it is useful to emphasize a feature of the
16 If a positive minimum control error variance (rather than zero) is feasible, no control error variance above
that minimum is an equilibrium.
17 Rogo⁄ [21] has made this point with regard to CM. Palmqvist [19] incorporates explicit signalling in a
simpli￿ed variant of FS.
12discretion results that is likely to hold quite generally.
The results under discretion are driven by a simple principle: under discretion, the central
bank will only follow a strategy involving randomizing (adding noise to the control or announce-
ment) if it is indi⁄erent among the random outcomes that may result. This is a very general
principle from game theory (for instance, see Fudenberg and Tirole [11]) and it is easily under-
stood: when the time comes to obey the random number generator, the central bank will cheat
if some outcomes are preferred to others.
Thus, one gets noise under the CM loss because the bank is totally indi⁄erent to the e⁄ects
of the control error on in￿ation variance and employment variance. When the bank￿s loss varies
with the size of the realized control error, as seems most reasonable, such a result is unlikely to
emerge.
4 Endogenous announcements and the degree of transparency
Up to now, we have only considered equilibria that put an unnatural restriction on the options
available to the central bank: the bank cannot directly communicate with the private sector.
If the bank would truthfully announce ·t,t h e na n yv a l u eo fc o m m i t t i n gt o￿ 2
·>0would be
lost. Cukierman and Meltzer [7] (CM2) incorporate communication by forcing the central bank
to make an announcement of a ￿xed, imperfect quality. In this section, we endogenize the
announcement quality, allowing the central bank to choose the degree of transparency, ¿,e i t h e r
once-and-for-all under commitment, or every period under discretion.18
To explore the role such announcements might play, we now ￿x the control-error variance,
￿2
· > 0, and consider endogenous choice of the announcement »t under the assumption that the
private sector believes (2.9). Recall from (2.10) that the degree of transparency is measured by
¿, the squared correlation between the announcement, »t and the control error, ·t.T h eh i g h e r
this correlation (the higher the signal-to-noise ratio), the more precise will be the private sector￿s
inference about it and, hence, zt. For simplicity, we only consider the standard loss function
and not the CM loss function in this section. The results for the two loss functions di⁄er for the
same reasons as already explained above.
18 In terms of our notation, CM2 assume that the control-error variance ￿
2
· and the noise variance in the
announcement ￿
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134.1 Choosing the degree of transparency under commitment
Choosing the degree of transparency is di⁄erent from choosing the control-error variance in a
fundamental way; the control-error variance directly enters the loss function by feeding into
in￿ation and employment variance, whereas the degree of transparency does not directly a⁄ect
the economy. One might suppose that the central bank would be more in favor of imprecise
announcements than imprecise control. This intuition receives some support when the central
bank chooses the degree of transparency under commitment.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that the central bank, with the standard loss function, chooses ¿
once-and-for-all with no knowledge of the state of the economy.
(i) For the full parameter space, maximum transparency (¿ =1 )is preferred by the central
bank for 79.5 percent of the parameter space, whereas minimum transparency (¿ =0 )is preferred
for 18.6 percent. An intermediate degree of transparency is preferred for 1.9 percent.
(ii) For the small parameter space, minimum transparency is always preferred by the central
bank.
This proposition is shown with the numerical method described above. For most of the
full parameter space, the central bank prefers to be as transparent as possible. However, for a
relevant part of the parameter space (with ﬂ close to one and l⁄ close to zero), the preference
is uniformly for minimum transparency. The intuition for why a low l⁄ and a high ﬂ make the
bank more secretive is exactly as described after proposition 3.1: a zero l⁄ eliminates the rise
in average in￿ation bias that otherwise accompanies lower transparency, and a ﬂ approximately
equal to unity shifts the balance of future costs and bene￿ts in favor of less transparency.
4.2 Choosing the degree of transparency and the announcement under discretion
When the central bank cannot commit to announcing »t according to (2.9) for some ￿xed ¿,
the possible equilibria depend on what deviations are allowed. We allow the central bank to
either (i) set »t a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 . 9 )f o ra n y¿ tchosen in period t or (ii) set »t, deterministically
or randomly, to any value chosen in period t.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that the private sector believes that the announcement »t is selected
according to (2.9).
14(i) Suppose that the central bank must announce »t according to (2.9), but chooses the
degree of transparency ¿t in each period. Then only minimum (¿t =0 )and maximum (¿t =1 )
transparency are consistent with an equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose that the bank, in addition to choosing »t and ¿t in each period as in (i),c a n
set »t deterministically or randomly to any value it chooses in each period. Only minimum
transparency is then consistent with an equilibrium.
The proposition is proved in appendix B. It is straightforward to see that ¿t =0is an
equilibrium for (i) and (ii). When ¿t =0 , the announcement is useless and will be ignored by
the private sector. If the private sector ignores the announcement, the bank is indi⁄erent as to
what announcement it provides. Hence, it is willing to choose ¿t =0 . 19
We can rule out any intermediate value of ¿t with the following argument. Consider 0 <
¿t < 1. The bank is about to generate the announcement, »t = ·t + ”t, where the variance
of ”t is determined by ¿t.20 Increasing ¿t to 1 will not a⁄ect the average announcement; thus,
increasing ¿t in this way will not e⁄ect the average outcome for the economy. Raising ¿t will
decrease the variance of outcomes, by reducing the announcement variance. Since the bank
dislikes variance, it prefers ¿t =1to any intermediate value.21
All that remains is to show that ¿t =1is an equilibrium in (i), when the bank selects »t
according to (2.9) for some ¿t, but not in (ii), when the bank can select »t arbitrarily. Under (i),
when the bank must follow (2.9) and the private sector expects ¿t =1 , the bank could lower
¿t, but this would only raise variance without a⁄ecting average outcomes. Thus, the bank will
deliver ¿t =1 .
Under (ii), when the bank can choose »t as any deterministic or random function of its
information, ¿t =1is not an equilibrium, for the following reason. If the private sector expects




(…t ¡ k0 ¡ k1"t ¡ k3ztjt¡1 ¡ »t): (4.1)
But when the private sector makes an inference according to (4.1), the central bank can set
zt+1jt to any value by the appropriate choice of »t. Clearly, it will announce »t that minimizes
its expected loss EtV (zt+1jt;z t), subject to (4.1). It is straightforward to verify that the »t that
19 Note that these results give no clear direction of blame for this state of a⁄airs. The public ignores everything
the central bank says, and nothing the central bank says could improve the situation.







21 This argument does not rule out ¿ =0 , because at ¿ =0 ;the signal is ignored, so the variance in the signal
does not a⁄ect the economy.
15maximizes this expected loss is not »t = ·t as required in an equilibrium with ¿t =1(see
appendix B for details). Thus, if the private sector believes the announcement will be fully
revealing (¿t =1 ), the bank can arbitrarily manipulate its own reputation. Since the bank is
not best o⁄ when its reputation equals its true character, ¿t =1is not an equilibrium.
The fact that a fully revealing announcement is not an equilibrium￿it is not subgame
perfect￿without restrictions of the sort in part (i) is the starting point of Stein￿s [23] application
of Crawford and Sobel [6] to monetary policy. Crawford and Sobel show that under certain fairly
general conditions, when announcements are costless (cheap talk), truthful announcements are
not an equilibrium, nor are announcements with random noise added. These two results generally
hold for the same reason that they hold in our model: random noise is not an equilibrium since
the bank is not indi⁄erent among the random noisy outcomes; truth is not an equilibrium,
for if the public believes the announcement to be true, the bank has an incentive to cheat.
Crawford and Sobel show that the only meaningful announcement equilibrium involves the bank
partitioning the possible values for the scalar announcement variable and truthfully announcing
in which subinterval the variable lies.22
These results, as applied by Stein [23] and Gar￿nkle and Oh [12], are quite interesting and
potentially important. Existing results are only for static games, however, whereas the announce-
ment game of central banks is inherently repeated with dynamic state variables. Furthermore,
for the central banking application it is also somewhat troubling that the only cheap-talk equi-
libria in the Crawford and Sobel framework involve partitioning the announcement space and
announcing in which segment the variable lies. When the general public is one of the players,
it might seem that we should be able to observe some aspect of this partitioning equilibrium in
the real world. In our view, there is no clear evidence of this sort.23 In a dynamic framework,
the set of cheap-talk equilibria would, naturally, be substantially richer. Exploring this ques-
tion in the context of our extension of CM￿s dynamic framework would be interesting, but is
beyond the scope of existing results and of this paper. As argued in the next section, the case
of commitment rather than discretion is arguably more relevant with regard to the choice of the
22 If the bank were to cheat, with the partitioned announcement space, it would have to move expectations a
discrete distance into some other subinterval. Crawford and Sobel show that there will be partitions for which the
bank will prefer announcing the true subinterval to some other interval a discrete distance away. A key feature of
these announcements is that they are a deterministic function of information (avoiding the problem with random
noise equilibria), but that the function cannot be inverted (so that the announcement is not fully revealing).
23 CM2 notes that the way target ranges are used by central banks might be interpreted as a partially revealing
equilibrium. Target ranges do not ￿t naturally into the partitioning equilibrium, however. While we may often
observe a range being announced for an announcement variable, most often the possible ranges that might be
announced are overlapping (that is, we may imagine the bank announcing x § ¢,w h e r exis continuous). This
not consistent with the Crawford and Sobel equilibrium.
16degree of transparency, which makes the results of proposition 4.1, including the possibility of
full transparency, more relevant than those of proposition 4.2.
In summary, under commitment, minimum transparency is the only equilibrium for the small
parameter space, which is arguably the more relevant part of the parameter space. Maximum
transparency is the only equilibrium for most of the full parameter space. Under discretion
minimal transparency is generally an equilibrium, and maximal transparency is an equilibrium
if the bank￿s options are limited to adding mean-zero noise to the truth.
5 Commitment or discretion?
The results in sections 3 and 4 suggest that the combination of the degree of control and
transparency that we see in practice will depend on what commitment mechanisms are present
in actual economies. Let us therefore consider the plausibility of commitment and discretion for
the choice of the degree of control and transparency.
5.1 The degree of control
With regard to degree of control, we ￿nd discretion more plausible than commitment. Remember
that the CM results in favor of a low degree of control depend on the twin assumptions that the
central bank cannot commit regarding the ￿rst moment of the policy instrument but can commit
regarding the second. Various factors that are often argued to facilitate sustainable commitment
seem more relevant to the ￿rst than to the second moment, however. It is relatively easy to
verify ex post that the central bank reacted as promised to nonstochastic elements of the rule.
It is much more di¢cult to know whether the noise induced by the central bank had the proper
variance.
Goodfriend emphasizes the possibility of adopting operating procedures that generate noisy
control. This is possible, in principle, but we think such an equilibrium would be precarious.
Even if the bank could publicly adopt and commit to suboptimal operating procedures, such
procedures would not clearly dictate a level of noise, and it would be di¢cult for the public to
verify that the central bank was indeed using the suboptimal procedure to deliver a particular
level of noise. One possible example of noisy control might be a commitment to an inappropriate
intermediate target, like a money-growth target or an exchange-rate target, when the true loss
function involves stabilizing in￿ation.24 The Bundesbank￿s emphasis on monetary targeting
24 See Svensson [24] and [25], for instance, for demonstrations that money-growth targeting is ine¢cient in
17might, at ￿rst, be seen as an example of this. However, a number of observers have come to the
conclusions that Bundesbank, as more fully argued below, is indeed following monetary targeting
only in words but in￿ation targeting in deeds. Therefore, the Bundesbank can be seen as an
example of the di¢culty of sustaining an equilibrium with noisy control through commitment
to an inferior operating procedure, and of the temptation to deviate from such an equilibrium
by using better control.
More generally, central banks have discretion over many techniques that could improve con-
trol, such as improving forecasting e⁄orts or data construction and analysis. The di¢culty for
outside observers to verify whether or not the central bank is pursuing these options￿together
with the incentive of the bank to secretly improve control￿would make the noisy-control equi-
librium very fragile, in our view.25
5.2 The degree of transparency
With regard to the degree of transparency, we believe that the existence of a commitment
mechanism is a more subtle issue. There are clearly commitment mechanisms that facilitate
commitment to low transparency. The Federal Reserve and other central banks have elaborate
internal rules about secrecy and the release of information, and there are legal and adminis-
trative punishment mechanisms that are used in the case of leaks or other improper releases of
information. At each time t, the bank may have an incentive to enact a one-time deviation from
such rules, but there are legislative and administrative barriers to such rapid rule changes.
There are also ways of committing to high transparency. The prime current examples of a
high degree of transparency are the high-quality In￿ation Reports regularly issued by in￿ation-
targeting central banks, notably Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bank of England and Sveriges
Riksbank. Creating such reports requires substantial resources, organization and planning. Just
as secrecy rules can be a form of commitment, a system for producing regular in￿ation reports is
probably di¢cult to reverse. Further, once the system is in place, it would be a most dramatic
action for a central bank to suddenly dismantle it; such an action would have very severe
consequences for the bank￿s reputation and might invite a legislative response.
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25 Lewis [16] argues for this point, claiming that it would be di¢cult for the government to force a particular
level of control since the bank has discretion over means for altering control. While Lewis argues that the central
bank would use its discretion to impose greater noise than mandated by the government, we ￿nd the opposite,
that it would impose lower noise. This is because Lewis implicitly considers it possible for the central bank to
commit to a higher level of noise than the government attempts to impose. The higher level of noise is supposedly
engineered secretly￿in violation of legislative intentions. It seems unclear how the central bank could sustain a
commitment to secret poor control.
18It remains true, however, that there would sometimes be incentives to hide or even manip-
ulate facts and forecasts in these reports, either to rationalize a policy action or obfuscate an
embarrassing lack of understanding of the economy. On the other hand, the standardized format
and the high degree of scrutiny makes temporary obfuscation without detection and embarrass-
ment quite di¢cult, certainly much more di¢cult than without the system. Thus, we conclude
that there are ways of committing to both high and to low transparency.
6 Conclusions
Results about the endogenous choice of control and transparency are more sensitive to assump-
tions about details of loss functions, commitment mechanisms and available strategies than has
previously been emphasized. For example, the CM result that central bankers may choose noisy
control in order to obscure its policy is weakened or overturned under a more standard loss
function or more plausible assumptions about commitment mechanisms.
Our discussion in section 5 leads us to conclude that discretion is more plausible for the
choice of the degree of control and that commitment is more plausible for the choice of the
degree of transparency. This combination implies that maximum feasible control by minimum-
transparency central banks is likely to be observed in practice.
We believe that both Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System provide examples of this.
With regard to in￿ation control, Bundesbank￿s performance in the post-War era is legendary;
the Fed￿s performance has been similarly strong since the mid 1980s. The Fed arguably has a
record of low transparency, however (see for instance Blinder [4]).26 While the Bundesbank￿s
framework of monetary targeting may appear to be a model of transparency, several analysts (for
instance, Neumann [18], von Hagen [27], Bernanke and Mihov [3] and Clarida, Gali and Gertler
[5]27) have concluded that the Bundesbank has systematically given priority to in￿ation control
when con￿icts arise between the in￿ation target and the monetary target. Thus, Svensson [25]
and [26] has argued that the Bundesbank￿s framework is in￿ation targeting in disguise, that
is, in￿ation targeting in deeds and monetary targeting in words only. Under this view, the
Bundesbank￿s framework is also one of low transparency.
The recent emergence of in￿ation-targeting central banks with a high degree of transparency,
may constitute a puzzling contradiction of these results. In some cases, notably the Reserve
26 See also Goodfriend [13] and Rudebusch and Walsh [22].
27 Note an unfortunate and essential typo in Clarida, Gali and Gertler [5], table 1, p. 1045: The coe¢cient in
the row for monetary policy and the column for » should be 0.07 instead of 0.7.
19Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of England, the high degree of transparency is imposed
on the central bank by the government, which is consistent with our results. One could argue,
however, that, ex ante, this imposition was actively promoted by those central banks, and ex
post, the imposition was enthusiastically accepted by the banks. Furthermore, some in￿ation-
targeting central banks, notably Sveriges Riksbank, have voluntarily established high standards
of transparency, albeit at a gradual pace.
What accounts for these exceptions from the general prediction? Since we believe that
commitment is the relevant paradigm for the choice of transparency, the model accommodates
this result only if these banks are not described by parameters in the small parameter space.
There is some reason to take this view: high-transparency in￿ation targeting tends to emerge in
countries with a bad in￿ation history. This is consistent with the view that the average in￿ation
bias in these countries historically has been su¢ciently large to support maximum transparency
as an equilibrium.
We are sympathetic with a related view of how high transparency has emerged. In prac-
tice, in￿ation-targeting governments, parliaments, and central banks put great emphasis on the
natural-rate hypothesis that monetary policy cannot a⁄ect long-run average employment and
output in justifying in￿ation targeting, and it can be argued that the hypothesis constitutes
one of the foundations of in￿ation targeting. This can be translated into a loss function for the
central bank consistent with the natural rate hypothesis, that is, with l⁄ =0and no average
in￿ation bias. Although this would, according to our results, reduce the attractiveness of trans-
parency for the central banks, we nevertheless sympathize with the view that policymakers in
these banks￿perhaps after a history of high in￿ation￿have concluded that a high degree of
transparency is best from a societal perspective. Although higher transparency incurs closer
scrutiny and monitoring by outsiders and thereby incentives for harder work and less comfort
within the bank, this is dominated by a resulting better monetary-policy performance for soci-
ety. As demonstrated in FS, higher transparency leads to a monetary policy that is better from
the perspective of a reasonable social loss function.
20A The equivalence with the Kalman ￿lter in FS
In FS, we assume
·t = ~ »t +~ ” t; (A.1)
￿2
~ » =~ ¿￿2
·; (A.2)
￿2
~ ” =( 1 ¡ ~ ¿ ) ￿ 2
· ; (A.3)
where the tildes are added to di⁄erentiate the FS speci￿cation from that of this paper. In FS,
we assume that the private sector observes ~ »t and, at the end of period t; constructs the variable
~ yt · …t ¡ k0 ¡k1"t ¡ k3ztjt¡1 ¡ ~ »t.
Then under the private sector￿s belief in (2.8) and (A.1), the variable ~ yt ful￿lls
~ yt = k2zt +~ ” t: (A.4)
This is the measurement equation in FS. Obviously, it is equivalent to the measurement equation
(2.19) under the assumption that
￿2
~ ” =V a r [ · t¡¿»t]=V a r [ · t¡¿( · t+” t) ]=( 1¡¿) ￿ 2
·; (A.5)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e d( 2 . 1 0 )a n d( 2 . 9 ) .S i n c eb y( 2 . 1 0 ) ,(1 ¡ ¿)￿2
· = ¿￿2




Furthermore, by (A.3) and (A.5), we have
~ ¿ = ¿: (A.7)
Thus, under the assumption (A.6), the Kalman ￿lter problems in FS and this paper are
identical, and the degree of transparency ¿ h a st h es a m ei n t e r p r e t a t i o ni nb o t hp a p e r s . I t
follows that the Kalman gain g in (2.20) is given by the same equation as in FS, except that
¿￿2
” is substituted for ￿2
”.
BP r o o f s
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Part (i). Suppose, contrary to the result, that some „ ￿2
· > 0 is an equilibrium. We show
that a one-period deviation to ￿2
· =0reduces the loss to the bank. If „ ￿2
· is an equilibrium
independent of the state, the choice of it in each period will be as in the baseline case. Call the
intended policy action ^ {t. The loss associated with allowing the error to be drawn with variance
„ ￿2
·, seen from the end of period t ¡ 1,c a nb ew r i t t e n




(^ {t + ·t)2 +( ^ { t+· t¡… t j t ¡ 1+" t¡l ⁄¡z t) 2
i
+ﬂE t ¡ 1V( z t +1jt;z t)
(B.1)
The expected loss from using the same ^ {t, but setting ￿2
· =0at t before returning to ￿2
· =„ ￿ 2
·






t +( ^ { t¡… t j t ¡ 1+" t¡l ⁄¡z t) 2
i
+ﬂE r;t¡1V (zt+1jt zt); (B.2)
21where the r subscripts indicate that this is the value when the bank reneges on the equilibrium
for one period. The value function for period t +1onward is the same in (B.1) and (B.2).
The value taken will be di⁄erent in the two cases, however, since the state variable zt+1jt will
take di⁄erent values for period t onward (depending upon the realizations of ·t under di⁄erent
variances).
Since ·t is independent of all other stochastic elements in the model, it is clear that the loss
for period t m u s tb el o w e ri n( B . 2 )t h a ni n( B . 1 ) .F o rp e r i o dt+1onward, expand the di⁄erence
in the expectation of the value function as





+ –5(Et¡1 ¡ Er;t¡1)zt+1jtzt:
The only di⁄erence between the two expectations is the variance of ·t and this variance only
depends on the second term on the right side. Since reputation, ztjt¡1, evolves according to
(2.20)
(Et¡1 ¡ Er;t¡1)V (zt+1jt;z t)=
1
2




t+1jt =( E t ¡ 1¡E r;t¡1)g2(·t ¡ E[·tj»t])2 = g2(1 ¡ ¿)„ ￿2
·:
This is positive in our case, since –2 > 0 (from proposition 2.1).
Part (ii). Suppose that any ￿xed „ ￿2
· > 0 is an equilibrium. We can follow the argument
of the proof of part (i). The two di⁄erences are that the period t loss is una⁄ected by the
control-error variance. Furthermore, since –2 =0in the CM case, the choice of ￿2
· in period t
does not a⁄ect the expected value of the loss from period t +1onward either.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
The argument that ¿t =0is an equilibrium in (i) and (ii) is given in the text. Now, we
show that no ¿t 2 (0;1) is an equilibrium in (i) and, by direct extension, in (ii). Suppose some
¿t 2 (0;1) were an equilibrium. Consider the point in time at t+ when the period-t economy
has been resolved but the announcement, »t; has not yet been given. If ¿t is an equilibrium, the
bank￿s optimum will be described by the value function
Et+V (zt+1jt;z t)=E t +
•











where the only random term is zt+1jt. Following the proof of proposition 3.2, consider the value
of using ¿ =1for one period before returning to the proposed equilibrium ¿t.S i n c ez t +1jt evolves
according to (2.20) under either strategy, the expectation of zt+1jt is the same under either ¿.
Since zt is known at t+, the only di⁄erence between the value of the loss function in the two
cases is, as in the above proof, –2 times the di⁄erence in Et+z2
t+1jt in the two cases. Since the
two means are the same, the variance is higher under ¿<1 ,a n d– 2>0(by proposition 2.1),
t h el o s sm u s tb el o w e rf o r¿=1 .
¿ t =1is an equilibrium in part (i): Assume that the private sector expects ¿t =1 .T h e
bank must use some ¿t 2 [0;1], and by the argument just given, using any ¿<1will raise the
loss function.
¿t =1is not an equilibrium in part (ii): Assume ¿t =1is an equilibrium. Following the
argument in the text, we need only show that the bank￿s loss is not minimized at »t = ·t.S i n c e
the bank￿s welfare is quadratic in zt and a given zt can occur with any ·t, it is clear that »t = ·t
cannot minimize loss for all zt and ·t.
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